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Swedish Welfare and Development in 
the Post-War Decades
Alexandru Zanca, University of Pennsylvania
Introduction
 Scandinavian nations are conventionally perceived as 
successful examples of welfare states, where capitalist market 
institutions and extensive social policies happily go hand in 
hand. Public fascination with the “Nordic model” began in 
1936 when the American journalist Marquis Childs published 
Sweden: The Middle Way, an appraisal of the reformist policies 
being introduced by the Swedish Social Democratic Party 
at this time.1 In reference to Sweden, Childs proclaims in 
the introduction of his book: “it is true that the domestic 
economy has been made to serve the greatest good of the 
greatest number.”2 This was a bold claim to make during the 
Great Depression about an economy of any kind. Turning 
into a bestseller overnight, Sweden: The Middle Way caught 
the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself. 
He subsequently decided to send a commission to Europe, 
including Scandinavia, to research cooperative systems there.3 
One result was an admiration for Swedish policymaking that 
persists among public officials to this day. For example, in an 
interview at the Wharton School in April 2019, former Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan suggested that the United States 
look to Sweden for inspiration on how to solve the current 
Social Security crisis.4
 However endearing the Nordic socialist utopia might 
look, liberal America’s fetishization of the Swedish model 
tends to simplify or erase the intricate mechanics behind 
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economic development in general, and Swedish development in 
particular. For centuries now, social scientists have been trying 
to understand and develop consistent theories on how nations 
bring about economic prosperity. One particular aspect that 
constitutes a “chicken or egg” dilemma is the directionality of 
the welfare-development relationship. For instance, the British 
economist John A. Hobson, in his study on imperialism, argues 
that sustained economic growth requires increases in taxes and 
wages;5 in other words, welfare promotes development. On 
the other hand, Columbia University professor W. W. Rostow 
proposes in his analysis of the stages of economic growth that 
welfare succeeds development, representing just one of the 
possible paths that nations may choose once they accumulate 
economic surpluses.6
 Given this divergence of views within the field of 
development studies, this paper aims to further investigate the 
nature of the welfare-development relationship and reconcile 
opinions on the matter. First, this paper argues that economic 
development and welfare are bidirectionally connected through 
mutually-enforcing dynamics at labor and social policy levels. 
Second, this paper proposes that, because the main factors 
acting on it are the domestic administrative system and 
international long-term trends, this relationship is delicate and 
susceptible to breakdown under inconsistent policymaking 
and inadequate political responses to crises. Sweden in the 
post-war decades of 1945-1975 constitutes an appropriate case 
study for supporting this two-fold thesis. As one of only two 
nations in Europe (the other being Norway) to feature social 
democratic hegemony, that is a near dominance of the political 
left over the state, for an extended period of time, Sweden 
presents a particular set of post-war policies that highlight 
valuable aspects of the welfare-development relationship.7 
In this regard, it is notable that during this period of general 
economic expansion in Europe, also known as “the Golden 
Age,” Sweden managed to maintain considerably high growth 
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rates8 alongside diminished economic inequalities,9 10 having 
seemingly overcome the efficiency-equity trade-off within the 
welfare-development relationship.
Historical Context
 Towards the end of the 20th century, the labor 
movement started to gain ground in Sweden, its main 
branches being the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges 
socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) and the Swedish 
Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 
LO). In the context of increasing capitalist pressures and under 
the influence of socialist ideas migrating from Germany, the 
SAP formed in 1889 as an extension of regional trade unions 
and socialist groups. The SAP served as the central party for the 
movement, as well as the main trade union organization until 
the creation of the LO in 1898.11 The labor movement found 
favorable factors in Sweden, rising alongside the evangelical 
and temperance movements as part of a series of popular 
movements. With a population that was over 50% rural at 
the time, Sweden saw popular movements easily form roots in 
tight-knit, self-organized countryside communities.12
 At the beginning of the 20th century, significant 
systemic changes impacted Sweden. The nation with its modern 
borders formed in 1905 after the dissolution of its union with 
Norway.13 Additionally, in 1911, universal suffrage for men 
was achieved, consequently increasing the SAP’s representation 
in the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament).14 As the nation 
restructured, so did the SAP. In 1917, a small revolutionary 
faction of the party separated and formed the Communist 
Party. The SAP that remained after the split advanced with a 
vision of peaceful reform and transition. Nationalization, a 
key issue in the SAP’s program throughout the 1920s, became 
increasingly marginalized and had been replaced by 1932 with 
the concept of a planned economy that was less concerned with 
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issues of proprietorship.15
         The building of the Swedish Parliament in Stockholm, also known as the Riksdag
 However, Marxist tendencies could not gain traction in 
Sweden, which has a strong Protestant tradition based on values 
of individual responsibility. Abandoning the SAP’s Marxist 
ideologies left behind a void that the party leadership quickly 
filled with ideas borrowed from German academic socialism, 
the British Fabians and, most of all, Keynesian expansionism. 
Thus, from the 1930s onwards, the SAP incorporated the 
theory of leveling economic cycles (saving during expansions 
to spend during recessions) and the theory of purchasing 
power (stimulating the economy through robust wages to 
sustain demand) into its fundamental crisis management 
policy.16 In terms of class structure, interwar Sweden featured 
a weak middle class, a well-organized industry and business 
community, mostly represented through the Swedish Employers 
Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen, SAF), and a 
vast, uniform proletariat. According to class theory, this meant 
there was a trade-off that the SAP had to face when seeking the 
support of these groups. Given the SAP’s close ties with the 
LO, the obvious choice for the party was to rely on strong class 
politics directed at the working class, which ended up forming 
most of the party’s electorate.17
 The cumulation of trends and events in the early 
20th century -- ideological shifts, expanded voting rights, the 
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popularity of labor movements within Sweden’s class structure 
-- made it possible for the SAP to attain a dominant position 
in the Riksdag and become identified with the larger national 
interest. This culminated with the SAP gaining control of 
the government in 1932, which it maintained uninterrupted 
until 1976. During the World War II period, the SAP further 
boosted its popularity by marching on a platform of neutrality.18 
19 
Policy-Making Framework 
 At the beginning of this remarkable stage in the SAP’s 
and Sweden’s shared existence, both the nation (at least in 
its geographical sense) and the party were young. In terms 
of policymaking, this meant a lack of institutional memory 
and reduced risk-aversion created an increased potential for 
unconventional outcomes. Moreover, as the SAP began its long 
reign in Sweden, the nation was already robustly industrialized. 
Per capita income increased by 131% from 1870 to 1910 along 
with the consolidation of an export-based technological sector 
that included Nobel Industries, Atlas Copco, L. M. Ericson, 
ASEA, Alfa-Laval, and SKF. In the inter-war period, the 
consumer durables sector took off as well. Given this productive 
prowess that Sweden had developed over the previous half-
century, the 1930s world economic crisis proved to be gentle on 
its economy.20 This favorable business cycle constituted a third 
factor contributing to Sweden’s unconventional policymaking 
outcomes.
 Esping-Andersen notes that the Swedish welfare state 
is peculiarly structured so that it reconciles efficiency with 
equity. Although costly, the welfare system is mostly perceived 
as an investment that will pay for itself later. The policymaking 
philosophy is one of “productivistic” and preventive social 
policy, which translates into minimal public support for 
providing unemployment benefits but considerable spending 
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  Framework for unconventional policy outcomes
for education, healthcare, and labor mobility. Government 
action is not meant to disincentivize employment but support 
it, thus encouraging citizens to contribute productively to 
society and become more deeply integrated within it. The party 
developed a narrative around folkhemmet (“People’s home”), 
the idea that the whole nation should feel like home for the 
Swedish people.21 As a result, any government interventions 
that the SAP designed had to subscribe to the principles of 
assisted self-help -- the idea that welfare assistance does not clear 
individuals of responsibilities but seeks to boost their abilities to 
improve their situation--and universality -- the idea that welfare 
does not carry any stigma but serves to foster social integration 
and elevate individuals to full citizenship status. With such 
guidelines, the nation and the party became paternalistic, 
burdened by the mission of designing a Swedish identity on the 
idealistic model of the “conscientious worker.”22
 In order to secure and hold onto political power, the 
SAP employed a strategy of accord initiatives and “open-door 
politics.” This was not a strategy of compromise, but one of 
gaining cross-class trust (for example, by not taking part in 
revolutionary actions that would alarm the upper classes) 
and then working with others towards reframing party goals 
in ways that were tolerable for the opposition.23 Indeed, the 
main reason why the SAP was able to hold the government for 
so long was its capacity to build coalitions.24 In this way, the 
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SAP developed a socialist paradigm that worked from within 
capitalism and not against it. The importance of industrialists 
and corporatists as collaborators in the consolidation of welfare 
states is often overlooked because of the misconception that 
these actors would be damaged by, and are therefore opposed 
to, extensive social policy. However, influenced by the indirect 
connection between the SAP and the SAF and mediated by 
the LO, Swedish reformist policies were carefully shaped to 
be in the interest of capitalists too. The government-led social 
programs took pressure off employers to provide private social 
benefits in order to attract scarce labor. Active labor mobility 
and restructuring measures coupled with investment training 
also suited the needs of profit-maximizing private enterprises.25 
The SAP’s implementation of labor market reforms, family and 
gender policies, and fiscal restructuring, discussed in turn in 
the sections below, followed this framework and exemplified 
the underlying logic of obtaining concomitant welfare for the 
citizens and development for the nation by playing these two 
facets of the economy against each other. 
Labor Market Reforms
 Due to a strong network of entrepreneurs and 
industrialists that developed over the 19th and 20th centuries, 
Sweden came out of the global economic crisis of the interwar 
period unscathed. This network, mostly represented by the 
powerful Wallenberg families that controlled important 
technological companies and banks, was very proactive in 
matters of industry modernization and restructuring, as well 
as crisis response. Later, after World War II, the private sector 
boomed. Consumer durable firms, including but not limited 
to Electrolux, Luxor and Facit, expanded their production to 
serve a growing international market. Heavier sectors performed 
surprisingly well, too. For instance, Swedish shipbuilding 
reached 10% of global production by the 1960s.26 The Marshall 
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Plan was also a favorable factor to Swedish take-off.27
 The economy overheated as it reached full employment 
levels, triggering inflation. Policymakers were actually expecting 
a post-war recession and were caught unprepared. The 
expansionary policies that were prepared in anticipation of such 
a recession only served to worsen the situation. The government 
reacted by implementing a policy package including price 
controls, trade regulations, and specific taxes, but with little 
success at counteracting the expansion.28
 Gösta Rhen and Rudolf Meidner, economists at the 
LO, came up with an unconventional solution. At the 1951 
LO Congress, they proposed the so-called Rhen-Meidner 
Model (R-M Model). The two economists were critical of the 
conventional Keynesian approach previously employed by the 
SAP. They argued that Keynesianism is extremely inflationary 
in a tight labor market. Supposedly, in such a setting, wages 
tend to drift in a self-enforcing manner as groups of workers 
demand higher wages in response to other workers obtaining 
higher payouts as a result of competitive pressures. This is 
bad for the economy because it causes inflation, but it is also 
perceived as harmful for the cohesion of the labor movement.29 
In contrast, the R-M Model is shaped around 4 main goals: 
low inflation, full employment, high growth, and income 
equality. The achievement of these goals is based on three main 
policies: predominant tight fiscal policy over the business cycle, 
solidaristic wages and active labor market mediation. Thus, 
the R-M Model is both a macroeconomic theory of wages and 
employment and a policy action program.30
 The solidaristic wage policy, or “equal pay for 
equal work,” means that wages are uniformly set across 
industry sectors instead of being left to fluctuate along with 
unpredictable market conditions. Wages are negotiated among 
labor unions and employers’ organizations within each industry 
so that wage differentials are decreased. For workers, the benefits 
lie in the more equitable income distribution. For capitalists, 
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it is a decrease in competition for labor. For the socialist 
government, it was an easy fix to the spiraling inflation.31
 There are side-effects to the solidaristic wage plan, but 
these are perceived as being features of the model. Inefficient 
businesses that rely on underpaid workers to function are likely 
to fail should they be forced to pay the industry-wide wage. 
This leads to continuous restructuring and economic migration, 
à la Schumpeterian creative destruction, with fresh labor supply 
for the more resilient and efficient enterprises that survive. 
Here is where the active labor market mediation part of the 
R-M model comes into play. The government should step in 
to aid with the transition of workers through various welfare 
and training schemes. In the long-term, the hopes are that the 
economy becomes stronger and more efficient, with the right 
workers in the right places and the closure of insufficiently 
productive enterprises.32
 The R-M Model quickly became influential on the 
SAP’s actions. To reinforce the solidaristic wage policy, the LO’s 
position as a negotiator in relation to the SAF was strengthened. 
The government also consolidated the Public Employment 
Service (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS), so that it could recruit 
its staff directly from among trade union representatives 
with real life knowledge of the labor market’s particularities. 
The initiatives proved effective in taming the economy while 
sustaining high rates of employment and equalizing earnings. 
This, in turn, lessened the need for the redistributive welfare 
state. Last but not least, the quality of jobs improved, and 
Swedish workers were brought closer to middle class status.33 34
 The labor market movements that took place in 
Sweden in the post-war period show that welfare and economic 
development are closely and bidirectionally connected through 
a relationship that needs to be carefully managed. The favorable 
global business cycle at the beginning of this period empowered 
unions and prompted the government to intervene in labor 
force allocation. In this way, workers’ welfare was improved 
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 through a more equitable income distribution and smooth 
transitions among jobs. In turn, productivity increased and the 
economy became stronger. However, this market dynamic was 
heavily dependent upon the close collaboration and sustained 
efforts of many actors -- SAP, LO, AMS, and employers -- to 
reduce labor market frictions as much as possible. 
Family and Gender Policies
 Gustav Möller, minister of social services in 1924-1926 
and 1932-1951, is conventionally seen as being the founding 
father of the social democratic welfare state. Coming from a 
humble, working-class background, Möller held radical views 
of what a social democratic society should look like, while also 
arguing for a gradual implementation. He strongly believed in 
a universal support system that did not stigmatize the recipient. 
He hoped to achieve this through reduced means testing 
and an administration modeled after the AMS, with “street 
bureaucrats” as staff. Most of all, he hoped for a welfare system 
that could confer autonomy to mothers and their children. 
Möller’s influence was key in minimizing means testing and 
centralization in the Swedish welfare state.35
 Other similarly influential voices in the SAP were Alva 
and Gunnar Myrdal. In 1934, the two sociologists published 
Crisis in the Population Question, drawing attention to an 
imminent demographic crisis in Sweden caused by drastically 
low childbirth rates. The couple argued that the traditional 
family had become dysfunctional and the state should intervene 
to regulate the consumption decisions of families. Furthermore, 
children should be taken away from their families and raised 
by society. They believed this would result in a reinforced sense 
of social integration for the children and a liberation of parents 
(especially mothers) from the constraints of family life.36
 Needless to say, the Myrdals’ views were too radical for 
the Swedish social democracy, but their rhetoric did manage 
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to construct a pronatalist agenda for the SAP, in favor of high 
birth rates.37 Throughout the 1930s, family policy turned 
into population policy. The government forbade the firing of 
pregnant women, while also implementing programs such as 
housing loans for young married couples and paid maternity 
leave. Another remarkably simple but very effective policy 
launched at this time was the disbursement of maternal aid, 
maternal insurance, and children allowances directly to mothers 
instead of their husbands, a considerable structural alteration 
of conventional gender roles. The apogee of progressivity was 
reached in 1972 when governmental reports started replacing 
the term “maternal allowance” with “parental insurance.” For 
the first time in Swedish public life, the responsibility for child 
rearing was perceived as shared among the parents.38 39
Swedish sociologists Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, authors of Crisis in the Population Questions 
and Nobel Prize laureates for Peace and Economics, respectively
 In post-war Sweden, measures for assisting mothers 
were slow to be implemented because they were seen as 
damaging by both traditionalists and progressivists. The former 
worried about undermining the paternal role and harming the 
family structure. The latter was concerned that motherhood-
based rights might consolidate the gender divide, instead of 
alleviating it. In practice, despite all the progress made, women 
continued to live under an implicit “housewife contract” 
Penn History Review     49 
Swedish Welfare and Development
throughout the SAP’s period of political hegemony.40 Within 
the party, Olivia Nordgren made efforts to legitimize “the 
housewife profession,” enforcing traditional roles and opposing 
gender equality.41 Despite these efforts, female participation in 
the workforce increased, especially in part-time jobs.42 Although 
the solidaristic wage policy rendered a gender-based wage gap 
structurally impossible in its conventional sense, a distributional 
gap persisted, with most women working in the public sector 
rather than the private sector.43
 It might be useful to consider how the Swedish model’s 
approach to gender compares to other European states. 
According to historian Susan Pedersen, the British welfare 
state, with modest allowances for children and mothers, was 
shaped by influential labor unions that wanted to preserve the 
“breadwinner” status of the male worker. On the other hand, 
France developed more robust family allowances in order 
to avert unionizing pressures and to promote a pronatalist 
agenda.44
 With the examples of British and French welfare as 
frames of reference, Sweden’s ability to develop a “middle way” 
stands out once again. The Swedish case combined the French 
pronatalist element with British-style acceptance of gender 
imbalances and strong labor unionization. The former aspect 
explains the extensive family policies, while the latter might hint 
towards an answer for the observed distributional gender gap 
between public and private workforce. Labor unions tended to 
favor a conservative patriarchal structure. The private sector was 
more heavily unionized, resulting in women having a harder 
time joining it. 
 All in all, the Myrdals’ near-apocalyptic views of 
a degenerating and vanishing Swedish society failed to 
materialize. In fact, in the post-war period, marriage rates 
reached record levels and birth rates recovered. It remains 
unclear whether these changes can be attributed to the SAP’s 
policies alone or were a natural outcome of strong economic 
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growth.45 In any case, the temporal coincidence of increased 
natality, reinforced welfare state, and consistent economic 
growth in the 1940-1970 period are indicative of an underlying 
mechanism linking development and welfare. In the Swedish 
case, the outcomes of post-war family and gender policies 
further support the view that welfare and development reinforce 
each other through a delicate, bidirectional relationship. 
Debates on Swedish demographic trends prompted government 
actions that rebalanced gender roles and improved the welfare 
and autonomy of women and children. These generous 
measures were made possible by a burgeoning economy. 
At the same time, the markets benefited from the increased 
workforce participation of women and population increase that 
ensued. However, these trends were threatened by social and 
cultural attitudes resistant to the economic emancipation of 
women, especially in the private sector. To maintain a steady 
pace of progress, the government had to reconcile the implicit 
“housewife contract” with economic motives.
The Crumbling of the Swedish Fiscal State
 As discussed before, the intentions of the welfare state 
were to elevate the Swedish worker to full citizenship status. In 
the process, a large middle class was created. The middle class 
that emerged in the 1950s came with its own unionization 
structures, as well as private pension plans that disrupted social 
cohesion. The flat-rate state pension that all workers benefited 
from failed to satisfy middle class desires. Therefore, in 1959, in 
order to accommodate its evolving electorate, the SAP passed 
the controversial earnings-related ATP pension scheme.46
 Esping-Andersen considers the implementation of the 
ATP scheme a “watershed” moment in the SAP’s existence, as 
the party started to shift focus from the working class to the 
middle class. The foundational universalist principle gained 
new meaning as the SAP’s policymakers abandoned egalitarian 
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aspirations and instead chose to preserve moderate levels of 
inequality. Attempting to remodel the welfare state for the 
wants of the middle class was costly for the government, 
requiring considerable increases in tax rates. Therefore, this was 
also the moment when the tax system started to degenerate.47
 The 1970s brought oil price shocks, stagflation, and 
slow global growth.48 It also started to look like the R-M model 
was backfiring. The negotiated solidaristic wages stagnated 
rather than adjusting with the development of the economy. 
This meant that, in some industries, businesses were pocketing 
the entirety of the value of increased worker productivity. In 
1975, the LO and Meidner came up with a drastic solution 
for the democratization of capital. The Wage-Earners’ Funds 
proposal involved seizing profits, establishing funds under 
employees’ names, and thereby allowing employees ownership 
of the enterprises they worked for. Needless to say, such a 
revolutionary initiative was unpopular and negatively impacted 
the labor movement’s image.49
 Right before the 1976 elections, the popular Swedish 
writer Astrid Lindgren published a pamphlet titled Pomperipossa 
in the World of Money lamenting the 102% marginal tax rate 
that she faced and criticizing the tax system. Her views were 
representative of popular dissatisfaction with increasingly 
convoluted taxation schemes. The media scandal that followed 
barred the SAP from winning the elections again. After 44 
years of rule, the SAP’s hegemonic social democratic regime 
in Sweden came to an end.50 More than anything else, the 
state of the fiscal system towards the end of this period shows 
how sensitive the welfare-development relationship is to 
inappropriate policymaking. As soon as the SAP abandoned 
its commitment to near-equality and universalist policies in an 
attempt to appease the emerging middle class, welfare ceased 
supporting economic development and the party’s actions 
backfired.
52     Alexandru Zanca
Swedish Welfare and Development
Conclusion
 Almost four decades after the release of his first 
bestseller, Marquis Childs returned to Sweden to investigate the 
outcomes of social democracy. Subsequently, in 1980, Childs 
published Sweden: The Middle Way on Trial, raising doubts 
about the state of the Nordic model and its future trajectory. It 
looked like the Swedish welfare state had reached a crisis point 
with unclear prospects.51
 Ultimately, the Swedish case study indicates that welfare 
and development are interlinked in a mutually reinforcing 
manner. It has been repeatedly observed that social and labor 
policies meant to increase public welfare directly supported 
the economy by reducing labor market frictions, improving 
workers’ productivity, and boosting domestic consumption. 
At the same time, a performant economy was essentially a 
necessity for the government to implement its welfare policies. 
One might even be justified in wondering whether welfare and 
development are not actually one and the same thing, or at least 
two sides of the same coin.
 This study has also shown that the welfare-development 
reinforcement system is quite fragile, especially in the Swedish 
case. Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme used to employ the 
metaphor of a snail to describe the slow and steady pace of 
social democratic reformism.52 When a certain threshold of 
well-being and near-equality was achieved, the welfare state 
lost its natural rhythm and the capacity to address further 
demands from those it had assisted. What ensued was more of 
a political failure than an economic one. Policymaking that was 
excessively accommodative of myopic demands and inconsistent 
with societal long-term goals tended to stretch the welfare 
state beyond the room available in the welfare-development 
relationship. Perhaps next time a nation attempts social 
democracy, moderation should be prioritized more highly. Until 
then, one of the biggest questions that remains to be answered 
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in the Swedish case is the title of a 1955 Economist article about 
Sweden: “What follows equality?”53
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, who held office from 1969 until 1976 
and then again from 1982 until his assassination in 1986
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